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Backing up the argument: |
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Prior to the war, Iraq was not Israel’s primary threat, although
the Israeli security establishment was somewhat ambivalent about the
extent of danger from Iraq. While Iraq supported Palestinian terrorism
against Israel over the last number of years, it was only a minor
financial sponsor compared to Iran and Saudi Arabia. |
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The primary state that threatened Israel was Iran. If Israel wanted
to prod– which it did not –the US to go to war on its
behalf, it would have chosen Iran, not Iraq. |
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Iraq was a potential primary threat for other countries in the region,
like Iran, Kuwait and Saudi-Arabia. |
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Besides the declared objectives of the Iraq War, there is something
persuasive about the thesis of former counterterrorism advisor to
the US National Security Council Richard Clarke's that in the case
of Iraq, the dominant consideration was concern over the long-term
stability of the House of Saud and the need for the US to replace
a shaky Saudi Arabia with an alternative friendly source of oil for
the industrial West. Considering the widespread presence of Al-Qaeda
cells across virtually all parts of Saudi Arabia that has now
become evident after repeated terrorist attacks in that country, this
American consideration has been proven to be prescient. But this has
absolutely nothing to do with Israel. |
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In early 2003, of all of Israel's neighbors, it was Syria who possessed
by far the largest stockpile of ballistic missiles - at least 500
missiles, or about ten times the size of the Iraqi arsenal. The Syrians
could mount on them the same biological or chemical warheads as the
Iraqis, with one important difference: Iraq had to reduce the size
of its warheads in order to extend the range of its missiles; thus,
the quantities of non-conventional material that could be delivered
by the Syrian missile forces were considerably greater than those
of Iraq.
( See
background ) |
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