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Backing up the argument: |
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Until the international non-proliferation regime, including the
IAEA, as well as the OPCW (Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons), is proven to be reliable, Israel and other
potential targets will need to guarantee their national survival through
independent capabilities. |
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Given these caveats, to the degree that the Libyan and Iranian regimes
end WMD programs and capabilities, including long-range
ballistic missiles, the Middle East will become more stable, and Israel's
security environment will improve significantly. Libya and Iran are
both involved in terrorism, and are leaders of the "rejectionist"
front. Iranian officials continue to call explicitly for the destruction
of Israel, which constitutes a direct violation of the basic rules
of international behavior and the UN Charter. |
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Until the Iranian and Libyan capabilities are fully dismantled,
with credible safeguards in place, the threat to Israel will continue.
Furthermore, Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia continue to maintain or
seek weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles, and pose
similar threats to Israel. Realistic efforts toward negotiating a
WMD-free zone in the region would have to encompass these countries
as well. |
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The revival of calls on Israel to follow these examples ignores
the fact that, unlike Libya and Iran (as well as Iraq, Syria, and
Egypt), Israel is not an NPT signatory and has not
violated any of its international obligations. Instead, Israel has
repeatedly called for the creation of a nuclear-weapons-free zone
in a Middle East at peace, based on mutual verification by regional
states, as a more reliable monitoring mechanism than the IAEA. In
addition, Israel has not called for the destruction of any country
in the region, including Iran. |
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Israel remains the only country in the Middle East whose physical
existence is still threatened by states seeking weapons of mass destruction.
The attempt to create symmetry involving Israel, where none exists,
deflects attention from these very real threats. Its ambiguous deterrence
capability has served Israel well in insuring its survival within
a very hostile environment. If this environment changes, Israel's
deterrence posture will adjust accordingly.
( See
background ) |
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