Israel and the issues of arms control and regional security arrangements

Conceptual issues in the nuclear domain have already been discussed in the multilateral Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group that met between 1992 and 1995. There, Israel made clear what it had declared a decade earlier - that its long-term vision is identical to that of its allies: making the Middle East free of all types of non-conventional weapons, in the belief that this will be made possible once comprehensive peace relations prevail among all the countries of the region.

Israel's agreement to the idea of a regional security dialogue, parallel with the peace process, can also be found in the guidelines of the Road Map: In the second phase of the Road Map the five multilateral tracks are to be restarted, among them arms control and regional security. Egypt caused the suspension of these tracks. Yet, if the Road Map, which enjoys broad international legitimacy, were to be implemented, then later on the multilateral tracks will also be advanced, among them arms control and regional security.

It is true that Israel's security environment has improved in the past few years, particularly after the destruction of Saddam Hussein's arsenal of Scud missiles and other weapons and the fall of his regime. In addition, after the Libyan government was caught attempting to import components for the production of enriched uranium, it relinquished major WMD-related components, including chemical weapons materials. This is another direct benefit of the Iraq War. The threat of massive conventional attacks against Israel has also diminished with the end of the Cold War and the parallel decline of Syrian and other forces that had been aligned with the Soviet Union.

However, the fundamental asymmetry that has always characterized Israel's strategic position in the Middle East remains unchanged. In the regional turbulence which has increased as a result of the war in Iraq, Israel's miniscule territorial size and small population could present an irresistible target of opportunity for yet another Arab leader seeking to divert attention from internal pressures. From this perspective, Israel's nuclear deterrent option is given credit for preventing catastrophic miscalculation, even in the case of Saddam Hussein. Israel is not going to be destroyed, and the only rational alternative is mutual acceptance.