Israel and Libya’s example of renouncing nuclear weaponry

Libya's declaration in December 2003 that it was ending its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, dismantling the capabilities and facilities that it had already developed, and opening its territory for inspections marks an important stage towards the reduction of threats and instability in the Middle East.

However, after decades in which Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi was directly involved in terrorism, and given Libya's long history of deception, particularly regarding production of chemical weapons at the Rabta complex, the latest pledges must be viewed with some caution. (After the US threatened to bomb Rabta, the Libyans claimed that it was destroyed in a fire, while apparently moving production to another site.) In addition, in the Arab League and other frameworks, Libya's anti-Israel and anti-American rhetoric remains intense and rejectionist, and its position on the Palestinian issue calls for the replacement of Israel with a bi-national state.

It is true that this time, the Libyan public statement was preceded by inspections of WMD facilities by US and British experts, which adds credibility. But Qadhafi's pledge to implement transparency and open up all facilities to international inspection remains to be implemented and tested.

In these preliminary inspections, Libya, like Iran, was found to have blatantly violated its commitments under the 1970 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The unreported and unsafeguarded enrichment of uranium, which is the essential step for manufacturing atomic weapons, is explicitly prohibited, and remained undiscovered by the IAEA. In the absence of intelligence information pointing to such illicit activities or threats of major military action from both the Bush administration and the UK - backed up by the very visible example of Iraq - Libya and Iran would have been able to develop nuclear weapons within a short time period.

The ability of both Libya and Iran to violate their legal commitments and obtain the necessary technology from external suppliers (Pakistan, North Korea, as well as Western sources, are suspected in this process) is further proof of the inadequacy of the verification and safeguards systems that are employed by the IAEA, which is charged with implementing the NPT. It is important to recall that the IAEA, under Hans Blix, gave Iraq a clean bill of health prior to Israel's strike on its Osiraq reactor.